The Questionable Future of the Iranian-Russian Relations
Iran’s under-fire President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad turned to his favorite ally, Russia, to escape the raging demonstrators in Tehran’s bloody streets protesting his controversial landslide victory. He showed up in Yekaterinburg at a regional summit and sat side-by-side with world leaders proclaiming the age of empires had ended and attacking the United States as usual; though he flew a day after and left before a scheduled press conference. Iranian President wanted to prove that his firm grip is in control back home when it is completely the opposite case. His bilateral meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev ended up being very short to the extent that they did not even sit down. The first Russian reaction to the controversy was Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov’s statement describing the elections as an “internal affair of the Iranian people”. Clearly, Moscow is watching closely the escalating situation in Tehran which shaked the very foundation of so-called the “Islamic Revolution”. The allegations of a possible rigged win cast shadows on Ahmadinejad’s legitimacy and consequently his own power over Iran’s political system. Even if he survived the current turmoil, he will spend his term as a prisoner in the castle of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Russia is fully aware of that and is worried of the new developments in one of its key partners. By and large, the presence of volatile regional players such as Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with common interests and antipathy toward the United States, will force the once-wary neighbors to proceed with their partnership maybe with less enthusiasm. Relations between the two countries officially commenced in 1592 during the reign of the Safavid dynasty, but they had typically prickly relations before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The main Russian-Iranian disagreements have been over how Iran will obtain commercial grade enriched uranium, Iranian impatience concerning repeated delays in the completion of the Russian-built nuclear reactor at Bushehr, what use will be made of Russia’s Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan, and over natural gas, oil, and the delimitation of the Caspian Sea. However, in October 2007, relations appeared to improve dramatically when then- President Vladimir Putin visited Iran becoming the first Russian leader since Joseph Stalin to set foot on Iranian soil. The visit was soon followed in December 2007 by the inauguration of the previously agreed to but delayed delivery of 82 tons of enriched uranium, increased weapons sales to Iran reaching the amount of $700 million, and the acceleration in the plans to form a natural gas cartel similar to the OPEC oil one. Putin also tried hardly to keep the Iranian “nuclear dossier” under the purview of the IAEA which cannot impose sanctions on Tehran if signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty were not in compliance with it. For Russia, Iran is a regional power and an important trade partner. It needs Iran for arms sales and the latter needs Russia for energy security and political protection at the United Nations. They both need each other to limit the political influence of the United States in Central Asia and the spread of pan-Turkic sentiments in the region. Yet, the solidity of the ties remains to be tested especially after the 12th of June dilemma in Iran, as many predict a gradual fade in the relations. The Kremlin is keen to preserve ease with the White House inhabitant Barack Obama. Medvedev announced lately that his country is ready to cut its nuclear arsenal, realizing that Moscow is increasingly becoming dependent on its economic relations with the West, and is thus becoming vulnerable to pressures in trying to curb its ties with Tehran. Iran will eventually find itself more isolated, with a questionable legitimacy problem, and more pushed into an alliance with China. If history repeats itself this time again, Russia might sell Iran as it sold Iraq in 1990 for a potential compromise.
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